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Introduction
Shortly after the Second World War, UK manufacturers complained that the strict
Canadian Electrical Code made it difficult for them to export electrical goods to
the Canadian market. Unimpressed, the editor of  a Canadian technical journal al-
lowed that “requirements are not severe and are readily met by manufacturers on
the North American continent.”2 The situation had not arisen suddenly. During the
war, Ford engineers travelled to England to get the technical drawings for Rolls-
Royce’s Merlin aircraft engine, which Ford planned to mass produce in the United
States. To the chagrin of  their British counterparts, the engineers rejected the draw-
ings for this purpose as the tolerances specified were far too lax for Ford’s produc-
tion methods.3 In fact, probably since the 1920s the general run of  manufacturing
practice in North America had been in advance of  England and elsewhere in Eu-
rope. But what is particularly revealing about the editorial comment is that it was
not an expression of  nationalistic opinion but a casual expression of  continentalism.
The issue was not that British practice differed from and was inferior to US and
Canadian practice, but that it was different from and inferior to a common North
American practice. 
The Second World War has often been cited as the decisive influence
which moved Canada from a British political empire to a US economic one.Massive
state-directed programs like the Materials Coordinating Committee, the Joint Eco-
nomic Committee, the Joint War Production Committee, and the Joint Agricultural
Committee in this view reshaped the economic landscape making it more conti-
nentally integrated.4 This, however, is to confuse cause with effect. Such wartime
coordination was only possible due to the existing degree of  technical uniformity
between Canadian and American industry. A complete account of  how North
American industrial practice evolved in this fashion would require a complete history
of  US and Canadian industry. The scope of  this article is more modest. It examines,
for the early twentieth century, the process by which the two countries came to
share common technical practices in manufacturing and beyond in the economy. It
shows that in this process, as with other aspects of  economic integration, state ac-
tors in Canada enthusiastically facilitated the northward extension of  the American
economy, sometimes by their actions and sometimes by benevolent inaction. It
shows as well the role played by members of  the technical middle class – profes-
sional engineers and the like – in this process, sometimes as state agents, sometimes
as corporate employees and, crucially, sometimes in the institutional framework of
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their own professional organizations.5 The process of  continental integration was
not then a simple, unidirectional expansion of  the American economic “empire”
facilitated by Canadian compradors and a supine if  not collaborative political elite.6
Rather it was an active and shared process with a variety of  actors pursuing indi-
vidual goals and arriving at a common outcome. To show this, I will first give a very
brief  introduction to the historical phenomenon of  the integration of  the Canadian
and US economies. Then I will look at the evolution of  a common Canadian-Amer-
ican industrial practice, the technological dialogue carried on across the international
border, and finally the role of  a shared regime of  technical standards. 
The path-breaking work of  Gabriel Kolko drew historians’ attention to
the role of  government, particularly big government, in Progressive-era America
in regulating industry to its own benefit.7 Ellis Hawley, one of  the leaders of  the
so-called organizational school of  American historians, has continued the story into
the interwar period, describing the relations between Herbert Hoover - as Secretary
of  Commerce and then President - and industry-wide associations.8 What the or-
ganizational synthesis has rarely dealt with effectively is the state. Canadian histori-
ans, perhaps more comfortable with Marxist conceptions, have been more ready to
put the state centre-stage in their analyses. Notably, Tom Traves has outlined how
the representatives of  Canadian big business found sectoral regulation of  industry
during the First World War rather more to their liking than not and would have
been glad to see a vigorous Canadian regulatory state continue acting on their be-
half.9 This study supports the view of  regulatory states on both sides of  the border
acting hand in glove with trade associations and with engineers, architects, public
health doctors, and the like to solve the technical problems of  transnational capital.
If  Marx viewed the state in his day as the executive committee of  the bourgeoisie,
by the time of  the Second Industrial Revolution, it might also be described as the
secretariat for an alliance of  trade associations. 
Economic Integration
With greater drama going on in American history in the decades after the Civil War,
the broadening and deepening economic relationship with Canada attracted little
attention at the time and has attracted even less from most scholarly accounts of
US history of  the period. However, as Walter LaFeber notes, by the turn of  the
century policy makers at the highest level in the United States were noticing that
“trade, as well as investment, was rapidly moving north.”10 For the United States,
not autarchic but with its own continental national economy, this relationship, like
all of  its external economic relationships, was significant but not crucial. Brute force
imperialism with formal political control as well as Big Stick, great power hegemony
could be used to secure raw materials and markets. But that can cost money and
present other political costs. Canada was a useful and safe source for investment, a
ready and willing market for goods that could be undifferentiated extensions of  do-
mestic production runs and a secure source, among many, of  raw materials. Occa-
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sionally the latter were of  more than marginal importance.11 The need for inexpen-
sive newsprint to feed the voracious appetites of  American presses obliged America
to access Canadian forests largely on Canadian terms. As we shall see, this led to
explicit and determined efforts to seek technological uniformity in a highly inte-
grated continental pulp and paper industry. The nickel for the steel in imperial
America’s navy came out of  the ground in the Sudbury basin, carted off  first to
New Jersey but later, at Canadian insistence, refined in Port Colborne, Ontario,
bringing state-of-the art processing as well as extractive technologies (and environ-
mental degradation) to Canada. The electrochemical industry which developed in
Niagara Falls, New York relied on cheap hydroelectric power. Most of  it came from
across the river, generated by what became the single largest electrical utility in the
world, the Hydroelectric Power Commission of  Ontario. Organizationally, Ontario
Hydro, a public agency, was frequently cited as a model by American Progressives
and Hydro’s engineers were active in the formulation of  North America-wide tech-
nical standards, often through service on US committees of  engineering and tech-
nical associations. 
From the Canadian perspective these developments were not marginal;
they were central to the country’s development. Canadians were certain they wanted
an independent polity but were less certain how economic propinquity might relate
to that. There were false steps. Canadians at first opted for a wider railroad gauge,
but the economic costs of  this technological protectionism were quickly realized
and track was re-laid using the American 4’ 8 ½” standard.12 In this instance inte-
gration rather than protection best fit the objectives of  both Canadian and US cap-
italists. The Canadian national government pursued a similar development strategy.
Focused on railroads, immigration and homesteading, but above all else, on a pro-
tective tariff, the National Policy was a have-your-cake-and-eat-it-too strategy vis-
à-vis the United States. On the one hand it intended to foster an east-west rather
than north-south economy, creating and maintaining an independent political econ-
omy north of  the 49th parallel. On the other hand, it had the intended effect of  en-
couraging US manufacturing firms to jump the Canadian tariff  wall and set up
manufacturing facilities in Canada to supply Canadian (and sometimes wider Im-
perial) markets.13 And jump they did, a jump eased by very similar consumer tastes
in both countries. Once domiciled, American branch plant firms happily benefitted
from and indeed participated in nationalistic efforts aimed at promoting consump-
tion by Canadians of  Canadian-made goods.14 It was not commodity markets, store
shelves, and capital flow alone which truly integrated the North American economy.
In addition, common solutions to common technical problems of  production were
sought and found.
A Common Industrial Practice
The most obvious way in which American manufacturing norms came to Canada
was via American production facilities built in Canada. Westinghouse, Kodak, Ford,
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and scores of  other companies did not just bring dollars; they also brought tech-
nology and industrial practices to Canada that were easily implemented. Canadian
industry took on an increasingly American flavour in its tools, materials, and shop
practices. As Zeff  notes, even Canadian accounting practices moved from British
to US forms, which he attributes, in part, to the influence of  US direct investment,
but also to the influence of  US textbooks and education models for the profes-
sion.15 In Canada both branch plant firms and domestically owned ones shared a
common technical practice. At least by the interwar period contemporaries were
identifying a common North American industrial standard and contrasting it
favourably to that of  Europe. For example, in 1928 the President of  the Packard
Electric Company, commenting on the possibility that European bids for trans-
formers might be considered by the city of  Winnipeg, wrote “in the long run they
would be very much dissatisfied and sorry … everything about the manufacture
would  be far different than on this continent,” and added for good measure “we
know for a fact that the electrical steel made on the continent and in England is
very much poorer than any steel manufactured on this continent.”16
A good illustration of  how technical and economic integration worked in
the context of  broader trends in business and industry of  the time is given by Gre-
gory P. Marchildon in his study of  the Portland cement industry.17 The technology
of  Portland cement manufacturing as well as the consolidation of  a fragmented in-
dustry both came to Canada thanks to the combined efforts of  Canadian and Amer-
ican industrialists and engineers. Portland cement was invented in England in the
1820s but by the end of  century the technological cutting edge of  the industry
shifted to the United States and Germany, the co-leaders of  the Second Industrial
Revolution. In 1886 when a Montreal chemist, Thomas M. Morgan, went into part-
nership with a local businessman to produce Portland cement in Canada, his first
step was to study new state-of-the-art plants being set up at the same time in the
United States. In 1907 the company was sold to American interests and in 1909, it
became part of  what would become the dominant firm in the industry - Canada
Cement. A group of  Philadelphia capitalists bought a Canadian Portland cement
plant in Marlbank, Ontario in 1898 and replaced the older style kilns with American
rotary kilns. Canadian R.P. Butchart, another principal player in the Canada Cement
merger, and the first person to build a cement factory in Western Canada, also in-
stalled American continuous process rotary kiln technology which by the early twen-
tieth century was the Canadian standard. William Foster Cowham, an American
expert in the field, constructed Portland cement factories in several US states as
well as Ontario and Quebec. His system made extensive use of  mechanized process
control and electricity, hallmarks of  Second Industrial Revolution production. As
Chandler has explained, it was the large, managerially-intensive oligopolistic modern
corporation which was best able to exploit these new technologies (and, though
Chandler would not say this, to encompass the social relations of  production).18 By
the first decade of  the twentieth century, however, productive capacity in the Cana-
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dian cement industry was fragmented among a large number of  mostly small firms,
some Canadian-owned and some branch plants of  US firms, established in Canada
to evade Canadian tariffs. In 1909 Joseph Irvin, who had been instrumental in in-
troducing Cowham’s technology into Canada, met with financier Max Aitken and
arranged the merger which created Canada Cement. The financial chicanery in-
volved led, of  course, to Aitken leaving the country with his ill-gotten gains.19
The Second Industrial Revolution, with its concomitant rise of  science-
based industry, was the era when the United States surged ahead in world economic
leadership as well as in establishing itself  as an imperial power.20 To some extent
the increasingly integrated Canadian economy was simply carried along. But Marvin
McInnis has gone so far as to suggest that “Canada was arguably the most successful
exploiter of  the new technology of  the Second Industrial Revolution.”21 If  this was
just a story of  a one-way technological spill-over from the United States, it would
be a simple one of  limited interest. That was not the case, and we need neither cel-
ebrate Yankee know-how nor stand in awe of  American technological sublimity.22
Some Canadian firms sold goods or, more rarely, acquired production facilities in
the United States. Occasionally Canada even managed to stay ahead of  the US in
its production practices. Significant technological developments originated north
of  the border. For example, Nova Scotia geologist Abraham Gesner developed the
earliest method of  distilling kerosene (which he named) from coal. Union Carbide
bought the patent for the efficient production of  calcium carbide (to make acety-
lene) from Canadian Thomas Wilson. The commercial pumping of  North Ameri-
can petroleum was underway in southwestern Ontario shortly before it was in
Pennsylvania. McBryde has referred to facilities in Ontario as a “Pilot Plant for the
Chemical Refining of  Petroleum in North America.”23 For a time the Canadian sys-
tem of  rotary drilling rivalled the American system of  percussion cable-drilling in
the international petroleum industry.24 As Winder has carefully documented, farm
equipment producers in Canada and the United States through patenting and li-
censing arrangements created, contributed to, modified, and drew from what can
best be described as a common North American pool of  technology.25 What can
we make of  the origin of  the Jordan Spreader, an important piece of  railway main-
tenance equipment? It was invented by Oswald F. Jordan, a superintendent with the
Canada Southern Railway in St. Thomas, Ontario. The Canada Southern was itself
a division of  the New York Central Railway and Jordan himself  moved to Chicago
where he established production facilities for his device, which was sold to railways
in both Canada and the United States, custom built for each line.26 Perhaps the most
revealing case, however, comes from the industrialization of  food production. Dur-
ing the 1880s and 1890s American cheese makers engaged in a ruinous race to the
bottom with cost and corner-cutting production shortcuts. In Canada, however, ex-
port regulations constrained and restrained producers from such practices. As a re-
sult, the United States lost much of  its export market for cheese to Canadian
producers. This left the New York and Wisconsin cheese industries to play catch-
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up after state governments knocked heads together in the respective dairy industries
in a classic instance of  the regulatory state trying to save businesspeople from the
consequences of  their own greed. It is indeed a remarkable instance of  US state
agents working to compel private US industry to raise production standards up to
those prevailing north of  the border.27
The Second Industrial Revolution also featured the intensification of  sci-
entific research for and by industry. While in-house research by science-intensive
giants like Du Pont, Westinghouse, GE, and Bell Labs has attracted the most schol-
arly attention, this was only one part of  a much broader involvement in scientific
industrial research. Industrial research also involved programs of  investigations that
brought together small, medium, and large firms; universities; and public agencies.
They also brought together researchers on both sides of  the continental border as
the following two examples show. Tests on the endurance properties of  steel rails,
sponsored by the US National Bureau of  Standards, used data from both the Bal-
timore and Ohio Railroad and the Canadian Pacific Railway.28 A committee doing
fundamental work on the characteristics of  various fatty oils (example specific grav-
ity, flash point) had representatives of  the US Department of  Agriculture and pri-
vate firms such as Armour and Swift in the US as well as Canada Packers.29
Technological Dialogue
Rather than speaking of  technological transfer from US to Canadian industry as
part of  some triumphalist narrative of  American technological supremacy, it would
be much better to use Arnold Pacey’s concept of  a technological dialogue. Such a
concept downplays the initial transfer of  a technology in favour of  greater attention
to the response to it, modification of  it, and reciprocal influences.30 As Bruce Sin-
clair notes, Canadians did value and prefer American technology, as it was “so suc-
cessful and so easy to import.”31 But as he also notes, there was more to
Canadianizing American technology than painting a maple leaf  on imported ma-
chinery patterns. Canadians did not passively adopt US technology but rather
adapted it to local social and economic conditions. Peter J. Wylie, in a careful analysis
of  technical change in Canadian manufacturing in the first three decades of  the
twentieth century, shows that “Canadian manufacturers did not use U.S. technology
in unaltered fashion, but adapted it to be more cost efficient under Canadian factor
market conditions.”32 One of  the most nuanced discussions of  such a dialogue is
Dianne Newell’s study of  mining and refining technology in Ontario. The largest
part of  that technology originated in the United States but its implementation “in-
evitably involved Canada in experimentation, modification and improvement to suit
local conditions and solve bottlenecks.”33 The improved diamond drill of  the New
York City firm of  Severance & Holt was introduced into the lead mining industry
of  Missouri in 1869 and Colorado’s silver mining industry the following year. By
1873 it was in use in Ontario’s silver mining industry. New stamping machines to
crush ore developed in California mining camps in the 1850s and further improved
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in the copper district of  Lake Superior then spread swiftly through the Canadian
mining industry. But a particularly instructive case is the vanner, a type of  inclined
gravity shaker used in ore separation. A version was popular in the Michigan copper
region in the 1870s. A former Michigan mining captain, William Bell Frue, and a
New York mechanic, William Foster, developed the definitive version while working
at the Silver Inlet Mine in Ontario. Manufactured by a Chicago firm, Fraser and
Chalmers, it gained international use. In this context it is also significant that labour
(and labour organization) was transnational. James Otto Petersen has described the
importance of  labour in technological innovation in the Ontario mining industry.34
As the case of  the Frue vanner suggests, the role of  individuals as carriers
of  technological knowledge must not be neglected. With few restrictions on move-
ment or even immigration across the Canada-US border in this period, individuals
carried technical knowledge in both directions. Canadian engineers occasionally
complained about competition from US engineers and tried with limited success to
gain protection through government-enforced occupational licensure.35 They were
in fact the beneficiaries of  the easy movement of  engineers to projects on either
side of  the border. The Hoosac Tunnel, hailed by David Nye as an icon of  the
American technological sublime, was in fact completed by Canadian engineers Wal-
ter and Francis Shanly.36 Canadian Thomas Keefer, like so many North American
engineers of  his generation, got his first training working on the Erie Canal. After
a long and successful career mostly designing municipal waterworks in Canada, he
was elected President of  the American Society of  Civil Engineers.37 Knowledge
gained in the universities of  one country found applications in the industrial plants
of  the other. Ontario-born John Bates did his undergraduate training at Acadia Uni-
versity in Nova Scotia before going to the United States. He worked with the Arthur
D. Little Company in Boston and a New York paper company while studying for
the first PhD in Chemical Engineering awarded by Columbia University in 1914.
He returned to Canada to a long and successful career in the Canadian pulp and
paper industry.38 Frederick Mark Becket earned his electrical engineering degree at
McGill University in 1895 and also did graduate work at Columbia. He went on to
work in the Niagara Falls electrochemical industry and became head of  Union Car-
bide’s research laboratories.39 These are only some of  innumerable examples.
Technology is, of  course, more than just hardware and productive prac-
tices at work. One way in which shop floor practices were transformed in the Sec-
ond Industrial Revolution was via the redesign of  work processes by engineers, that
is, Taylorism or scientific management. The shops of  the major Canadian railroads,
which manufactured many of  their own cars and locomotives, had long emerged
as the most sophisticated and among the largest sites of  secondary manufacturing
in the country.40 Taylorist scientific management techniques, for example, crossed
the border when Henry Gantt brought them to the Canadian Pacific Railway’s
Angus Shops in Montreal where most of  the railroad’s rolling stock was manufac-
tured.41
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The other important way in which control over production at the factory
floor level changed was the growing reliance, not on individual human sensory
judgement, but instead on a panoply of  testing and control instruments. A variety
of  devices, “epistemic engines” Patrick Carroll-Burke calls them, interrogated the
physical state of  materials being transformed in production and formed the basis
for process control decisions.42 Giving a spurious veneer of  scientific objectivity to
the control of  work processes, they were in fact vital weapons in the shop floor
wars to wrest control away from workers.43 These instruments were usually, but not
always, manufactured by American companies. Westinghouse pressure gauges,
Brown pyrometers and flow meters, and Tycos recording thermometers were found
in plants and mills throughout North American industry. 
The pulp and paper industry, however, offers a striking example of  such
an “epistemic engine” which was developed first in Canada and then migrated across
the continent. In making pulp, one of  the factors that must be controlled is freeness,
the rate at which water drains away from the pulp as it forms into paper. In the
1920s the Canadian Forest Products Laboratories (FPL), located at McGill Univer-
sity, created a freeness tester to measure this property. Such a device was useful both
for the investigation of  the pulping and papermaking processes in industrial research
laboratories and for process control in the mill.44 Unsurprisingly, the Canadian tester
became the standard for use in Canada. In the US, the Technical Association of  the
Paper and Pulp Industry’s Committee on Groundwood Pulp conducted investiga-
tions of  several freeness testers before settling on the FPL’s, citing the Laboratories’
“excellent piece of  work.”45 The tester, which found wide acceptance in mills on
both sides of  the border, “was a powerful means of  encouraging additional technical
cooperation between the mills.”46 In more formal language, it made of  them what
Joseph O’Connell has termed a “material collective,” which he defines as “a com-
munity of  persons and institutions mutually exchanging the same representations
and material representatives for abstract scientific entities.”47
Organizing Industry for Production
The importance of  trade associations in the promotion of  technical uniformity in
North American industry cannot be exaggerated. The work of  Alfred D. Chandler,
Jr. and those who have built upon his approach has focused great attention on the
actions of  modern corporate enterprises. However, the success of  this new business
history paradigm has caused many historians to overlook the significance of  trans-
firm, industry wide organizations.48 This is unfortunate because it neglects the so-
called secondary organization of  industry as an important alternative strategy of
capital seeking security and predictability outside of  a Smithian and Darwinian mar-
ketplace. It is doubly unfortunate because this strategy is one, unlike that described
by Chandler et al., which very much involved the regulatory state as a partner with
business. Two examples of  pulp and paper and concrete best serve to illustrate the
importance of  trade associations.
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One of  the most explicit and successful cases comes from pulp and paper.
The industry itself  was economically integrated. Canadian timber was harvested by
both US and Canadian firms, processed into pulp in both countries, and both pulp
and finished paper products were sold across the border. The US-based Technical
Association of  the Paper and Pulp Industry (TAPPI) and the Technical Section of
the Canadian Pulp and Paper Association (CPPA) committed important resources
of  time and energy to the issue of  technical uniformity. Their most ambitious effort
was a series of  textbooks codifying existing technical practice in the industry. In
September 1918 the Committee on Education of  the CPPA along with the Com-
mittee on Vocational Education of  TAPPI met in Buffalo, New York. They estab-
lished a Joint Executive Committee to supervise the production of  a series of
textbooks on pulp and paper manufacture, what became The Manufacture of  Pulp and
Paper. The initial budget of  US$30 000 was later raised to US$57 000 and was shared
about 60:40 between Americans and Canadians. Royalties would be used to support
revisions. Eventually appearing in five volumes, it has been continually revised and,
with changes in title, is still in use. The textbooks formed a reference source for
state-of-the-art technical practice in the industry and was used in educational pro-
grams in the United States and Canada. In the case of  the latter, we see the role
played by the state in picking up part of  the overhead cost of  training new workers
with new knowledge for Second Industrial Revolution industries. We also see how
the struggle for shop floor control extended beyond the shop floor. Those new
workers with their new knowledge contended, with great success, for positions in
the pulp and paper mills with skilled workers with traditional knowledge gained by
on-the-job experience. Labour unions, often international ones, were supportive of
technical education but vigilant in wanting workers and working class children to
derive benefits from it.49
A different approach can be seen in the bringing of  new reinforced con-
crete construction technologies to industrial and residential buildings in Canada. In
both countries trade associations played important roles in promoting new concrete
materials and methods in construction. In the US the National Association of  Ce-
ment Users (later the American Concrete Institute) founded in 1904 issued recom-
mendations for concrete construction and criticised the American Society for
Testing and Materials for being too conservative in its views of  concrete.50 In
Canada, the Canadian Cement and Concrete Association (CCCA), founded five
years later, quickly set to work to make recommendations for concrete construction
which could be incorporated into municipal building codes. A key player was Gus-
tave Kahn,  Director of  Trussed Concrete Steel Company of  Canada, which helped
bring to Canada the system of  steel and concrete construction developed so suc-
cessfully in Detroit by Albert and Julius Kahn. Gustave Kahn was a Vice President
of  the CCCA and an active member of  the committee which drew up the recom-
mendations.51 Municipal building codes address both structural issues and also fire
safety. The US-based National Board of  Fire Underwriters’ model fire code formed
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the basis of  many municipal fire codes. A revision of  the code giving broad approval
for reinforced concrete construction marked an important landmark in the use of
that material. The adoption of  the Underwriter’s code was a major recommendation
of  American Society for Municipal Improvements’ Committee on Fire Prevention
when their report was presented at the Society’s 1918 meeting in Buffalo. That Com-
mittee, which reviewed both US and Canadian practices, was chaired by Alcide
Chaussé of  Montreal, the Honorary Secretary of  the Royal Architectural Institute
of  Canada.52 Canadian expertise in pouring a great deal of  concrete in cold weather
fed back into general North American practice. With the completion of  the Panama
Canal, Ontario Hydro’s Queenston-Chippawa generating station at Niagara Falls
was then the largest ongoing civil engineering project in the world. Ontario Hydro
civil engineer R.B. Young became a recognized expert on concrete, serving as a Di-
rector of  the American Concrete Institute and a member of  its Winter Concreting
Specifications Committee.53
The rise of  science-based industry during the Second Industrial Revolu-
tion drew firms, beginning with the railways, into increasingly exacting programs
of  standardization. Technical standards were developed and implemented using lab-
oratory tools and the language of  science and were important means by which sci-
entific control of  production was achieved. Until the creation of  the International
Standards Organization following the Second World War, standards were developed
and implemented almost exclusively on a national basis. In North America, the de-
velopment of  such standards took place in an economic context of  the integration
of  the Canadian and American economies, in particular the manufacturing sectors.
To put it simply, US light bulbs had to screw in to Canadian sockets, Canadian
prongs had to fit in American plugs and a watt and a volt had to mean close to the
same thing in Saskatoon and Tuscaloosa. Perhaps no other single factor was as im-
portant in harmonizing US and Canadian industrial practice and making that prac-
tice so sophisticated.54 Significantly, there was virtually no Canadian participation
in any British or “Imperial” standards setting. As with capital flows, this crucial
technological development saw Canada shift its attention from London to New
York. Perhaps, even more significantly, while US-based engineering and other stan-
dards-setting bodies welcomed and indeed expected the participation of  Canadian
technical experts, I have looked in vain to find a single instance of  British national
standards bodies involving Canadians in their work.55
While historians have paid far less attention to technical standards than
they have to, say, patents, standards are ubiquitous and essential. To give a simple
illustration, imagine if  each model of  car had an opening to its gas tank that could
only fit nozzles from one company’s gas stations. One of  the earliest and most im-
portant standards organizations, the American Society for Testing and Materials
(ASTM), defines a standard or standard specification as “a precise statement of  a
set of  requirements to be satisfied by a material, product, system, or service that
also indicates the procedures for determining whether each of  the requirements is
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satisfied.”56 Such standards can be internal to a firm. The modern industrial stan-
dards movement really got underway with the work of  Charles Dudley at the Penn-
sylvania Railroad starting in 1875. Beyond that, standards can be developed and
promulgated by industry trade and technical associations, engineering societies, and
organizations whose sole purpose is the development of  such standards. They are
called consensus standards and emerge out of  a combination of  laboratory inves-
tigation, industry best (or at least wide) practice and discussions – occasionally con-
tentious – among those who would use the standards. While they are not supposed
to, standards can be used, particularly by dominant manufacturers, to gain or main-
tain competitive advantage. They can also be used as a non-tariff  barrier to trade.
That is exactly what happened with the American Society of  Mechanical Engineers
Boiler Code, one of  the most important of  all such standards. Only in the US and
Canada was there an infrastructure to accredit manufactured boilers as meeting the
requirements of  that code and without such accreditation a boiler essentially could
not be sold.57 Where a common standards regime prevailed, this pre-empted stan-
dards use and probably benefited consumers, though such benefits are difficult to
quantify. While much is made of  the voluntary nature of  standards activity, such a
view, on the part of  those creating the standards, is disingenuous. They are coercive
and can, and indeed in many instances are intended to, become requirements. This
could happen in a number of  ways. As in the case of  steam boilers, insurance com-
panies can require the meeting of  a standard for an item, meaning that one which
does not will be uninsurable and thus commercially pointless. Also, a standard could
become so widespread that being a holdout is economically ruinous. More to the
point, standards get written into contracts and then are enforced legally. Finally,
standards are used by governments in regulatory activities (as with, for instance,
building codes) and thus acquire force of  law. 
In their practices many Canadian firms simply used US standards. Among
the biggest purchasers of  the rights to reprint ASTM standards, on par with
Carnegie Steel, was the Steel Company of  Canada.58 Even public roads in Canada
were built using US technical standards. For example, an Ontario Department of
Public Works contract specified that cement and pipes were to be to ASTM stan-
dards, and asphalt, according to technical information published in the Journal of
the American Chemical Society.59 Both Canadian subsidiaries of  US firms and domes-
tically owned companies advertised their adherence to US technical standards. Thus
the Canadian Ohio Brass Company and the T. McAvity & Sons company, the latter
a Canadian brass and iron products manufacturer, both assured their customers in
their marketing literature that they produced to ASTM standards.60 Canada had its
own standards infrastructure, centred on the Canadian Engineering Standards As-
sociation (CESA, later simply renamed the Canadian Standards Association or CSA
by which name it is known now). In fact, even nominally made-in-Canada standards
were either identical or closely conformed to US ones. One of  the first CESA stan-
dards was that for steel railway bridges. The Association’s justification for how it
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arrived at that standard is worth quoting at some length:
In view of  the obvious desirability of  agreement between a
Canadian specification of  this kind and similar documents
prepared by authoritative bodies in the United States, the
Sub-Committee and the Sectional Committee have carefully
considered the bridge specifications of  the American Rail-
road Engineering Association and the specifications for
bridge materials issued by the American Society for Testing
Materials. It is believed that the specification in its present
form, while not in absolute agreement with the American
specifications on all points, will be found to be in substantial
agreement therewith, the principal points of  difference
being such as are found desirable in order to comply with
Canadian conditions.61
This occurs again and again in the formulation of  CESA standards. When the Bell
Telephone Company of  Canada suggested the need for standards for galvanized
steel wire CESA obliged. But in the resulting standard, the winding of  the wire
strands conformed to the practices of  American Telephone and Telegraph and the
ASTM, while a chemical test that was part of  the standard complied with that of
the important US trade association, the National Electric Light Association.62 It
should be noted though that this was not simply a case of  a spill-over of  US tech-
nology into Canada. Canadian engineers frequently served on standards setting com-
mittees of  US organizations and were thus involved in the creation of  those US
technical standards which were applied in Canadian industries.
A variety of  other motivations, each involving both private interests and
the state, brought US and Canadian technological practices together. These included
taxation and regulation as well as safety and public health. A method developed by
Federal government scientists and engineers at the Pulp and Paper Research Institute
of  Canada for estimating sulphite content of  newsprint, significant inter alia to ap-
plication of  duties, was by the 1930s a standard in the US and Canada, being
adopted by the trade associations of  both countries.63 Two researchers at the labo-
ratories of  the Canadian Inland Revenue Department published a paper in the Jour-
nal of  the American Pharmaceutical Association on the analysis of  a type of  bark used
for medicinal purposes. Their discussion made a number of  references to the US
Pharmacopeia and the official nature of  the analytical work. But they thanked Dr.
J.M. Francis of  Parke and Davis of  Detroit for supplying samples and information.64
Even more significant was cooperative work in the area of  the healthfulness of
food. The much-studied Pure Food and Drug Act of  1906 has been seen by histo-
rians as a classic piece of  progressive era legislation. Framed in the public interest
(as indeed it was) it was supported by, and more specifically in, the interests of  big
food and pharmaceutical firms which welcomed government involvement and reg-
ulation, preferably at a national level. It was also welcomed by the chemists, engi-
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neers, and others who would frame, implement, and administer such national reg-
ulation. In fact this had an international dimension. As networks of  cold storage
facilities developed with the industrialization of  food in North America, raising new
questions about the healthfulness of  food, the American Public Health Association
(APHA) worked to develop information on the topic. Dr. Peter H. Bryce, Chief
Medical Officer of  the Canadian Department of  the Interior, was “in some measure
responsible for bringing the importance of  refrigeration as an economic, social and
health necessity” before the APHA in 1911.65 He was later a member of  the Asso-
ciation’s Committee on Cold Storage.66 Both Bryce and Dr. Charles J. Hastings, the
Toronto Medical Officer of  Health, served terms as President of  the APHA. The
Association also worked to develop standard methods for examining milk, a crucial
public health issue and one vital for the development of  the dairy industry during
a period of  rapid urbanization. In 1906, the APHA established a committee to look
into standard methods for examining milk. It began by surveying by circular letter
practices in the US and Canada. The committee made a progress report at its meet-
ing in Manitoba in 1908 and standards were published in 1910.67
Conclusion
The 49th parallel was also a paradox. It both mattered and did not matter. Technical
knowledge, like investment, flowed very easily across that border and technical prac-
tices which made sense in one country typically made equal sense in the other. And
yet there was a border. The general economic integration of  the continental econ-
omy showed the same paradox. Both countries maintained high tariff  regimes dur-
ing the last third of  the nineteenth and first half  of  the twentieth century and yet
saw a volume of  goods cross that border in tremendous quantity. Canada in partic-
ular used such a policy with the stated intention of  avoiding economic integration
and the accompanying danger of  political integration. Yet as a consequence of
American firms jumping the Canadian tariff  wall to create manufacturing capacity
in Canada, their smaller neighbour’s secondary manufacturing sector came to consist
in large measure of  branch plants of  US firms. Such integration came because of,
and not in spite of, the tariff. The flow of  technical knowledge across the border
was facilitated by that situation and by the easy movement of  people with technical
knowledge in both directions and other informal mechanisms. But because there
was a border and separate legal jurisdictions it meant that special institutional frame-
works were needed to implement technical coordination. This included public agen-
cies as well as a variety of  technical, professional, and engineering standards and
trade associations.
The seeming paradox of  economic integration occurring in a framework
of  nationalistic, protectionist economic strategies might be resolved by seeing this
as an instance of  what Dani Rodrik has called “smart globalization,” the selective
removal or maintenance of  trade barriers to achieve particular domestic economic
(and political) goals. While Rodrik has mostly looked at the post-Second World War
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experience, Andrew Smith and Dimitry Anastakis have shown how this concept
applies well to Canadian business and economic history of  an earlier period, a view
supported by this study.68
The establishment of  US industrial production and concomitantly US
industrial technology in Canada was the most obvious way in which a common
technological practice was established in the two countries, but it was not the only
one. Historiography has focused on the evils (or, depending on the historian’s
ideological predilections, virtues) of  large corporations and either clashes be-
tween or connivance among such corporations and government. This overlooks
the crucial role of  secondary organizations of  industry. Politically contentious
forms of  corporate concentration and tariffs bedevilled or enlivened the histories
of  Canada and the United States in the later nineteenth and early twentieth cen-
turies. But the educational and standards activities of  trade associations, when
they were even noticed, escaped popular, judicial, legislative, and regulatory cen-
sure when they did enjoy approbation or encouragement. The most important,
though not the only, role of  the State in this instance was not directive but per-
missive.
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